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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
of the writ by saying there was too much possibility of escape;20 or the
inconvenience was too great;2 1 or the expense was prohibitive.22 It has
been suggested that in view of these considerations, depositions be taken
at the place of confinement;23 or that the sworn affidavits made by the
prisoner-witness be filed with the court for use in the proceedings.2 4 Quite
obviously, a mere piece of paper precludes the benefit of personal testimony
both as to the petitioning party and as to the judge and jury.25 Beale
states, "It is*a general rule of law that where one has become subject to
the jurisdiction of a court, the jurisdiction continues in all proceedings
arising out of the litigation such as appeals and writs of error."'20 However,
the argument that a district court which puts the prisoner in question
beyond its territorial limits retains the power to bring the same person
again therein has been refuted.
27
The decision in this case can perhaps be attributed in part to the
social stigma attaching to prisons and prisoners, and the consequent
reticence of judges to allow the release of convicted criminals for a few
days even under the most desirous of circumstances. It appears that it
would have afforded a more equitable and reasonable solution to deny
the petition on the basis of the court's discretion rather than to so
soundly seal the door by applying the "no-jurisdiction, no-writ" rule; for
it is conceivable that a similar situation in the future might demand a




The defendant was indicted for selling intoxicants to Indians.1 A
general demurrer was sustained by the lower courts2 and the state appealed.
I-eld: A statute prohibiting sale of intoxicants to Indians is not violative
20. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 191 (1948); Price v. 'Johnston, 159 F.2d 234
236, 237 (9th Cir. 1947); Ex parte Bagwell, 79 P.2d 395, 397 (Calif. 1938).
21. United States v, Iayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-219 (1952); Ahrens v. Clark, supra
note 22; Price v. Johnston, supra note 22; Contra, United States v. Quinn, 69 F. Supp.
488, 492 (N.D. Il. 1946) (. , . if jurisdiction depends upon the matter of convenience,
the convenience of the petitioner far outweighs that of the Goverment or the court).
22. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 191 (1948); Price v. Johnston, 159 F.2d 234,
236, 237 (9th Cir. 1937); Brewer v. United States, 150 F.2d 314, 315 (9th Cir. 1945);
Neufield v. United States, 118 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Ex parte Bagwell, 79
P.2d 395, 396 (Calif. 1938).
23. State v. Brown, 89 So. 862 (Ala. 1921); Ex parte Bagwell, 79 P.2d 395, 396
(Calif. 1938); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
24. Murrey v. United States, 138 F.2d 94, 97 (8th Cir. 1943); United States
v. Chinn, 74 F. Supp. 189, 190 (S.D. W.Va. 1947).
25. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 280 (1948).
26. 1 BEALE, Tu CONFLICT OX LAWS § 76.1 (1st ed. 1935).
27. Hauck v. Hiatt, 50 F. Supp. 534, 535 (W.D. S.C. 1943).
1. IDAHO CODE, § 18-4201 (1879).
2. Justice of the Peace Court and District Court of Bingham County.
CASES NOTED
of the provision in the state constitution declaring equality, nor of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. State v. Rorvick,
277 P.2d 566 (Idaho 1954).
State legislation prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages to
certain classes of persons has been generally upheld as a proper exercise
of the police power.3 The arguments against such legislation have centered
around the reasoning that the statutes abridge the privileges of citizens
of the United States and of the state, as conferred upon them by the
Federal Constitution 4 and many state constitutions.5 More specifically it
is argued that class legislation is discriminatory and arbitrary, denying the
class equal protection of the laws.8 The courts have answered this charge
by saying,
Generally a statute is not discriminatory in the constitutional
sense when it creates a class of persons against or in favor of whom
it discriminates if the discrimination is not arbitrary or unjust
but is reasonable and founded on public policy.7
To clarify the meaning of "reasonable" class legislation the courts
have inquired as to whether the legislation protects the morals, health, and
general welfare of the people,8 or whether there is some substantial differ-
ence of situation or circumstance, that would naturally suggest the justice
or expediency of discriminatory legislation with respect to the objects
classified.9
It has been universally agreed that intoxicating beverages have destroyed
persons' morals and are therefore fit subjects for control by the state. 10
Hence it is within the police power of the state to prohibit sale of intoxicants
to classes of persons peculiarly liable to be injured morally or physically
by their use. The great weight of authority agrees that Indians fall within
this class. 1
3. State v. Nichols, 61 Wash. 142, 112 Pac. 269 (1910); State v. Manilock,
58 Wash. 631, 109 Pac. 47 (1910).
4. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
5. For a typical provision see FLA. CONSr. D.R. § 1.
6. People v. Bray, 105 Cal, 344, 38 Pac. 731 (1894).
7. State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 287 N.W. 313; People v. Bray, 105 Cal. 344,
38 Fac. 731, 733 (1894)('"The right to pursue and obtain happiness is not unlimited,
but subject, nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for
the good of the whole.").
8. Giozza v, Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657 (1893); Barbie, v. Connelly, 113 U.S. 27
(1885).
9. Peet Stock Remedy Co. v. McMullen, 32 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1929); State v.
Farmers and Merchants Irrigation Co., 59 Neb. 1, 80 N.W. 52 (1899).
10. State ex rel Wilkinson v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 332, 186 So. 487, 492 (1939)
("The power of a state with respect to intoxicating liquors is said to exist as a correlative
of its duty to support paupers, to protect the community from crime, and to confine and
maintain the criminal, since the liquor traffic is one source of pauperism and crime.");
State v. Nichols, 61 Wash. 142, 112 Pac. 269 (1910); State v. Mamlock, 58 Wash.
631, 109 Pac. 47 (1910).
11. See notes 3 and 6 supra.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The instant case agrees with the views expressed by the majority of
cases on point. They feel Indians are within a class of persons liable to
be particularly injured by intoxicating liquors. The dissenters base their
argument on the fact that this statute' 2 was passed many years ago when
Indians were lawless. The courts have never attempted, in recent years,
to justify the conclusion that Indians are a class of people peculiarly liable
to be injured by intoxicants.
It is obvious that the court, in the principal case, has not attempted
to use any aggressiveness in pioneering a change in a law that is definitely
outdated, but has been content to sustain this archaic legislation-on
grounds which factually may no longer exist. The original reason for such
Indian legislation was to protect the Indians, since they were considered
savages, with no education, not used to living in the midst of modem
civilization.' 3 The status of Indians over one hundred years ago brought
about prohibitive liquor legislation for their benefit; but there is perhaps,
no reason for a court, at the present time, to rely on cases passed forty
to one hundred years ago,14 since Indians of today, remote from the tribal
state, are as capable as any other race of coping with the vices of our
modem civilization.
The trend today is toward a stricter interpretation of the word "reason-
able," when a racial, or other irrational basis is involved, as has been
evidenced by decisions against class legislation affecting negroes.' 5 Judging
by this trend and keeping in mind the transition Indians have made from
a veritable savage state, to respected members of a civilized society, it
seems likely that statutes denying Indians the privilege to buy liquor will
come under direct challenge and be declared invalid in the near future,
at least with reference to the sanction of the Federal Constitution.
Mons WATSKY
COURTS-APPEALS OF ORDERS-STAY OF ACTION
In an action for an accounting, the defendant moved for a stay of
the action pursuant to Section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act.'
The district court found that the agreement under which arbiration was
sought did not constitute an agreement to arbitrate and entered an order
12. See note 1 supra.
13. 39 YALE L.J. 307 (1930).
14. See notes 3 and 6 supra.
15. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 686 (1954) (Denying
negroes the right to attend the same schools as whites was "unreasonable" class legisla-
tion.); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
1. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1947): "If any suit or proceedings be brought in any of the
courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement
in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being
satisfied that issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had
in accordance with the terms of the agreement .. "
